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1. INTRODUCTION
After more than two decades of extensive study on the complexity of single-winner voting problems, the computational social choice
community shifted their main focus to multi-winner voting very recently. Many variants of manipulation, control, and bribery problems
for approval-based multi-winner voting rules (ABM rules for short) have been studied from the complexity point of view (see e.g., [Aziz
et al. 2015; Yang 2019a; Faliszewski et al. 2017; Zhou et al. 2019]). However, these works are mainly concerned with the constructive
model of these problems where, in general, one is interested in making a single distinguished candidate a winner, or making a committee
a winning committee. The destructive counterparts of these problems seem not to have been widely studied in the literature so far.
Aiming at filling this gap, we propose several destructive bribery problems for ABM rules and study their complexity and parameterized
complexity. Our problems are defined to model the applications where an election attacker (or briber) wants to preclude multiple
distinguished candidates from winning by making some changes of the votes (or bribing some voters so that they change their votes)
while not exceeding his/her budget. The behavior of the attacker may be motivated by, for example, that these distinguished candidates
are his/her rivals (e.g., these candidates have completely different political views from the attacker), or the attacker wants to make them
lose in order to increase the chance of making his/her liked candidates win. We consider five particular bribery operations classified
into two classes: atomic operations and vote-level operations. Approval addition (AppAdd) and approval deletion (AppDel) are atomic
operations where each single AppAdd/AppDel means to add/delete one candidate into/from the set of approved candidates of some
vote. Vote-level change (VC), vote-level addition change (VAC), and vote-level deletion change (VDC) are vote-level operations where
each single operation respectively means to change a vote in any possible way, change a vote by adding some candidates into the set
of the approved candidates, and change a vote by deleting some candidates from the set of approved candidates. Each bribery problem
is associated with an operation type and the attacker can perform at most a given number of single operations of the same type. For
vote-level operation problems, we also introduce an integer distance bound r and assume that each vote can be only changed into another
one which has Hamming-distance at most r from the vote. This parameter models the scenarios where voters do not want to deviate too
much from their true preferences. Note that when r equals the number of candidates, the impact of the distance bound completely fades
out. Therefore, this parameter in fact only generalizes our study. We point out that bribery problems with distance restrictions have been
studied in the setting of single-winner voting recently [Yang et al. 2019; Baumeister et al. 2019; Dey 2019].
We study these problems under five widely-studied ABM rules, namely, approval voting (AV), satisfaction approval voting (SAV),
net-satisfaction approval voting (NSAV), Chamberlin-Courant approval voting (CCAV), and proportional approval voting (PAV). We
obtain the complexity of all problems considered in the paper. Many of our NP-hardness results hold even in very special cases. For
NP-hardness results, we also explore how numerous meaningful parameters shape the parameterized complexity of these problems.
The parameters considered include the number of candidates, the number of votes, the size of winning committees, the number of
distinguished candidates, the budget limits, and the distance bound discussed above. We obtain both fixed-parameter tractability (FPT)
results and W[1]-hardness results.
Related Works
Our work is clearly related to the pioneering works of Bartholdi et al. [1991; 1992; 1989] where numerous strategic single-winner
voting problems have been studied from the complexity point of view, motivated by that complexity can be regarded as a barrier against
strategic behavior.1 Since their seminal work, investigating the complexity of many single-winner voting problems, particularly of
strategic problems in both constructive model and destructive model, has been dominating the advance of computational social choice.
However, the research on the complexity of multi-winner voting problems had lagged behind with only a few related papers being
1It should be pointed out that several recent studies have shown that many computationally hard voting problems may be solved efficiently for practical elections.
This is the full version of the paper appeared in Proceedings of AAMAS 2020 (https://aamas2020.conference.auckland.ac.nz/).
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2rules total scores of w ⊆ C in an election (C, V )
AV
∑
v∈V |v ∩ w|
SAV
∑
v∈V,v 6=∅
|v∩w|
|v|
NSAV
∑
v∈V,v 6=∅
|v∩w|
|v| −
∑
v∈V,v 6=C
|w\v|
|C|−|v|
CCAV |{v ∈ V : v ∩ w 6= ∅}|
PAV
∑
v∈V,v∩w 6=∅
∑|v∩w|
i=1
1
i
Table 1: A summary of scores of five multi-winner voting rules.
published [Betzler et al. 2013; Meir et al. 2008; LeGrand 2004] until the work of Aziz et al. [2015] which largely sparked the extensive
and intensive study of the complexity of approval-based multi-winner voting problems. Among these studies, the following works are
most related to ours. Meir et al. [2008] studied both constructive and destructive manipulation and control but mainly for ranking-
based multi-winner voting rules. Faliszewski et al. [2017] studied various constructive bribery problems for ABM rules. Particularly,
they also studied the operations AppAdd and AppDel. Bredereck et al. [2016] studied constructive shift bribery for both ranking-based
multiwinner voting rules and ABM rules. Very recently, Yang [2019a] investigated the complexity of constructive manipulation and
control problems for ABM rules. Some constructive manipulation problems for ABM rules were studied by Aziz et al. [2015]. However,
in these problems there is only one distinguished candidate which is wanted to be included in the winning committee by the election
attackers, but we consider multiple distinguished candidates who are desired by the attackers not to be in any winning committees.
It should be also pointed out that destructive strategic voting problems with multiple distinguished candidates have been explored in
single-winner voting problems [Yang and Wang 2017] and in the setting of group identification [Erde´lyi et al. 2020; Yang and Dimitrov
2018]. Aziz et al. [2015] also studied a constructive manipulation problem where there are exactly k distinguished candidates, and the
goal is to make them exactly the winners. In contrast, we study destructive bribery problems and the number of distinguished candidates
is not necessarily to be the number of winners.
The destructive bribery problems studied in this paper are more or less related to the concept of robustness of multiwinner voting rules
which is concerned with the minimum amount of changes to alter the winning committees. In particular, Gawron and Faliszewsk [2019]
recently studied the complexity of determining how much operations are needed to change the set of winning committees in the setting
of approval-based voting. They considered the adding, deleting, and replacing operations. Our problems have different objective.
Compared with the conference version [Yang 2020], the current version contains all missing proofs whose corresponding theorems
and lemmas are labeled with ?.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In approval-based voting, each voter is asked to report a subset of candidates who s/he approves. Formally, an approval-based election
is a tuple (C, V ) where C is a set of candidates and V is a multiset of votes, each vote is cast by a voter and is defined as a subset
of candidates consisting of all candidates approved by the voter. A multi-winner voting rule f assigns to each election (C, V ) and an
integer k ≤ |C| a collection of k-subsets of candidates, each of which is called a winning k-committee under f . For a candidate c ∈ C,
let V (c) = {v ∈ V : c ∈ v} be the multiset of votes approving c.
In this paper, we study the rules AV, SAV, NSAV, CCAV, and PAV. In these rules, each vote offers a certain score to each committee,
and winning k-committees are those having the maximum total scores received from all votes. These rules differ only at how the scores
are defined. The scores of a committee w ⊆ C with respect to these rules are summarized in Table 1.
In AV, each voter gives 1 point to every candidate s/he approves. In SAV, each voter has a fixed 1 point which is equally distributed
among her/his approved candidates. NSAV takes a step further by allowing voters to present their dissatisfaction with their disapproved
candidates. Particularly, in addition to the fixed 1 point equally distributed among her/his approved candidates like SAV, each voter also
equally distributes −1 point among all her/his disapproved candidates. The AV/SAV/NSAV score of a committee is just the sum of the
total scores of its members. SAV and NSAV were respectively proposed by Bram and Kligour [2014] and Kligour and Marshall [2012].
In CCAV, it is presumed that voters only care about whether a committee contains at least one of her/his approved candidates. More
precisely, a voter is satisfied by a committee if at least one of her/his approved candidates is included in the committee. This rule selects
the k-committees satisfying the maximum number of voters. CCAV is a special case of a class of rules studied in [Chamberlin and
Courant 1983], and was suggested by Thiele [1895]. In PAV, each committee w receives 1 + 12 + · · · + 1|v∩w| points from each vote v
such that v∩w 6= ∅. PAV was first mentioned in the work of Thiele [1895]. A significant difference among these rules is that calculating
a winning k-committee is NP-hard for CCAV and PAV but polynomial-time solvable for AV, SAV, and NSAV [Aziz et al. 2015].
For each f ∈ {AV,SAV,NSAV,CCAV,PAV} and a committee w ⊆ C in an election (C, V ), let f(C,V )(w) denote the f score of w
received from all votes in V . For a singleton committee {c} where c ∈ C, we write f(C,V )(c) for f(C,V )({c}) for notion simplicity. We
omit the subindex from the notion if it is clear from the context which election is considered.
We study five destructive bribery problems characterized by five modification operations, including two atomic operations and three
vote-level change operations. The two atomic operations are defined as follows.
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3Approval addition (AppAdd). A single AppAdd operation on some vote v ∈ V such that v 6= C means that we extend v by adding
exactly one candidate in C \ v into v.
Approval deletion (AppDel). A single AppDel operation on some vote v ∈ V such that v 6= ∅ means that we remove one candidate
from v.
Let f be an ABM rule. Let X be an atomic operation.
DESTRUCTIVE X BRIBERY FOR f (DXB-f )
Input: An election (C, V ), a non-empty subset J ⊆ C of distinguished candidates, and two positive integers k ≤ |C| and ` ≤ |V |.
Question: Can we perform at most ` many X operations so that none of J is in any winning k-committees under f?
The optimization version the
Different from atomic operations, each single vote-level operation changes one vote in some specific way.
Vote change (VC). A single VC operation on some vote v means to change v into another vote which can be any subset of candidates.
Vote addition change (VAC). A single VAC operation on some vote v such that v 6= C means that we add some (one or more) candidates
from C \ v into v.
Vote deletion change (VDC). A single VDC operation on some vote v such that v 6= ∅ means that we remove some (one or more)
candidates from v.
Clearly, each vote-level operation on some vote equals to a series of atomic operations of certain type on the same vote.
To generalize our study as much as possible, we consider the distance-bounded bribery model where we are given an additional non-
negative integer r, and request that the Hamming distance between a bribed vote v and the new vote after a single vote-level operation
at v is at most r. Recall that the Hamming distance between two votes v ⊆ C and v′ ⊆ C is |v \ v′|+ |v′ \ v|. When r is the number of
candidates, this restriction completely fades out. Many of our NP-hardness results hold even when r is a very small constant.
For a vote-level operation Y defined above and a non-negative integer distance bound r, we study the following problem.
r-BOUNDED DESTRUCTIVE Y BRIBERY FOR f (r-DY B-f )
Input: An election (C, V ), a non-empty subset J ⊆ C of distinguished candidates, and two positive integers k ≤ |C| and ` ≤ |V |.
Question: Is there a subset V ′ ⊆ V of at most ` votes such that we can perform a single Y operation on every vote in V ′ such that the
Hamming distance between the vote after the operation and the original vote is at most r and, moreover, after all these |V ′|
operations none of J is in any winning k-committees under f?
We assume the reader is familiar with the basics in computational complexity, parameterized complexity, and graph theory, and we
refer to [Tovey 2002; Downey 2012; West 2000] for consultation. Our hardness results in the paper are based on reductions from the
following problems.
RESTRICTED EXACT COVER BY THREE SETS (RX3C)
Input: A universe A of cardinality 3κ for some positive integer κ, and a collection H of subsets of A such that each subset in H is of
cardinality 3, and each element in A appears in exactly three elements ofH.
Question: Is there an exact 3-set cover of A, i.e., a subcollection H′ ⊆ H such that every element in A appears in exactly one element
ofH′?
It is known that the RX3C problem is NP-hard [Gonzalez 1985]. Note that for every RX3C instance (A,H), it holds that |H| = |A| =
3κ, and each solutionH′ is of cardinality κ.
An independent set of a graph is a subset of vertices whose induced subgraph contains no edges.
κ-INDEPENDENT SET
Input: A graph G and a positive integer κ.
Question: Does G have an independent set of size κ?
A clique in a graph is a subset of vertices whose induced subgraph is complete (i.e., there is an edge between every two vertices).
κ-CLIQUE
Input: A graph G and an integer κ.
Question: Does G have a clique of size κ?
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5It is well-known that both the κ-INDEPENDENT SET and the k-CLIQUE problem are W[1]-hard [Downey and Fellows 1992]. More-
over, both problems remain W[1]-hard even when restricted to regular graphs [Cai 2008].
For a graph G = (U,A) and a subset U ′ ⊆ U , G[U ′] denotes the subgraph of G induced by U ′. For a positive integer i, let
[i] = {j ∈ N : 1 ≤ j ≤ i} be the set of all positive integers no greater than i.
Organization. We divide our discussions into several sections. In Section 3, we study the destructive bribery problems for CCAV and
PAV. Then, the subsequent section consisting of five subsections are devoted to the complexity of the five destructive bribery problems
for AV, SAV, and NSAV. After this, in Section 5 we study FPT-algorithms with respect to three parameters—m, n, and |J |. We conclude
our study and lay out several interesting topics for future research in Section 6.
3. NP-HARD WINNERS DETERMINATION RULES
We start our exploration with CCAV and PAV. Unlike other rules studied in this paper, for CCAV and PAV even WINNER DETERMINA-
TION is NP-hard [Aziz et al. 2015]. However, these rules are still interesting due to at least the following reasons. First, they satisfy some
proportional properties which are failed by other rules studied in the paper [Aziz et al. 2017; Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. 2017; Ferna´ndez
and Fisteus 2019]. Second, many FPT-algorithms and competitive approximation algorithms have been reported for calculating win-
ners under these rules [Aziz et al. 2015; Yang and Wang 2018; Skowron and Faliszewski 2017; Skowron et al. 2015]. Polynomial-time
algorithms for restricted domains have also been derived [Peters 2018; Yang 2019b].
We show that all problems defined in this paper are W[1]-hard under CCAV and PAV with respect to the size of the winning com-
mittees even when there is only a single distinguished candidate (|J | = 1), the budget is 0 (` = 0), and every voter approves only two
candidates. In fact, in this special case, we have exactly the following problem: given an election, a distinguished candidate p, and an
integer k, determine if p is not included in any winning k-committees under some rule f . Let us call this special case NON-WINNER
DETERMINATION FOR f (NWD-f ). Our W[1]-hardness result is based on reductions from the INDEPENDENT SET problem restricted
to regular graphs.
THEOREM 3.1. NWD-CCAV is W[1]-hard with respect to the parameter k, even when every voter approves at most two candidates.
PROOF. Let (G = (U,A), κ) be an instance of the INDEPENDENT SET problem where every vertex in G has degree exactly d for
some positive integer d. We create an instance of NWD-CCAV, denoted by ((C, V ), p ∈ C, k), as follows. For each vertex u ∈ U in G,
we create one candidate c(u). In addition, we create a distinguished candidate p. So, we have C = {c(u) : u ∈ U}∪{p}. The multiset V
of votes consists of the following votes. For each edge {u, u′} ∈ A, we create one vote v(u, u′) = {c(u), c(u′)}. In addition, we create
d − 1 votes each of which approves only the distinguished candidate p. Finally, we set k = κ. The construction clearly can be done in
polynomial time. It remains to show the correctness.
(⇒) Suppose that G has an independent set of size κ. Then, every k-committee corresponding to an independent set of size k satisfies
the maximum number of κ · d votes. However, every k-committee containing the distinguished candidate p is able to satisfy at most
(κ− 1) · d+ (d− 1) = κ · d− 1 votes. Therefore, p cannot be included in any winning k-committees.
(⇐) Suppose that G does not have any independent set of size κ. We claim that there exists at least one winning k-committee which
contains the distinguished candidate p. If p is included in all winning k-committees, we are done. Assume that there is a winning k-
committee w which contains only candidates corresponding to a set of k vertices in G. As G does not have an independent set of size d,
there exists at least one edge {u, u′} inG such that both c(u) and c(u′) are in w. In addition, as there are exactly d−1 votes who approve
only the distinguished candidate p, it holds that the committee w′ = (w \{c(u)})∪{p} satisfies at least CCAV(w)− (d−1)+(d−1) =
CCAV(w) votes, implying that w′ is also a winning k-committee.
For PAV, we can obtain the same result.
THEOREM 3.2 (?). NWD-PAV is W[1]-hard with respect to the parameter k, even when every voter approves at most two candi-
dates.
PROOF. The proof for PAV is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1. Let (G = (U,A), κ) be an instance of the INDEPENDENT SET
problem where every vertex in G has degree exactly d for some positive integer d. We create an instance of NWD-PAV, denoted by
((C, V ), p ∈ C, k), as follows. First, we create exactly the same candidates as in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Then, for each edge {u, u′} ∈
A, we create two votes v1(u, u′) and v2(u, u′) each of which approves exactly c(u) and c(u′). In addition, we create 2d− 1 votes each
of which approves only the distinguished candidate p. Finally, we set k = κ. The correctness arguments are analogous to the proof of
Theorem 3.1. If the graph G has a clique of size κ, then any k-committee corresponding to an independent set of size k has PAV score
2k · d. However, every k-committee containing the distinguished candidate has PAV score at most (2d− 1) + 2d · (k− 1) = 2k · d− 1,
and hence p cannot be included in any winning k-committee. Let’s consider the other direction now. If G does not have any independent
set of size k, then, similar to the approach in the proof of Theorem 3.1, one can check that any winning k-committee w without the
distinguished candidate can be modified by replacing one certain candidate in w with p to obtain another winning k-committee.
The above theorems give us the following corollary.
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6COROLLARY 3.3. For each f ∈ {CCAV,PAV}, the problems DAppAddB-f, DAppDelB-f, r-DVCB-f, r-DVACB-f, and r-DVDCB-f
are W[1]-hard with respect to the parameter k. These hold even when |J | = 1, the budget of the briber is ` = 0, and every voter
approves at most two candidates. For r-DVCB-f, r-DVACB-f, and r-DVDCB-f, the W[1]-hardness holds for all r ≥ 0.
4. POLYNOMIAL-TIME WINNERS DETERMINATION RULES
In this section, we investigate destructive bribery for AV, SAV, and NSAV whose WINNERS DETERMINATION problem is polynomial-
time solvable. First, we study a relation between SAV and NSAV elections which enables us to derive hardness results for NSAV from
those for SAV. Assume that we have a hardness result for SAV via a reduction where an election is created. Then, to show the hardness
for NSAV, we add a large set of dummy candidates who are never approved by any voter (and none of them is a distinguished candidate).
The large quantity of the dummy candidates ensures that the NSAV scores of candidates are dominated by their SAV scores, in the sense
that a candidate has a greater/smaller SAV score than that of another candidate if and only if the former has a greater/smaller NSAV
score than that of the latter in the election after adding all dummy candidates. Formally, the relation is as follows.
LEMMA 4.1. Let (C, V ) be an election where m = |C| ≥ 2 and n = |V |. Let D be a set of at least n · m2 candidates disjoint
from C. Then, for every two candidates c and c′ in C, it holds that SAV(C,V )(c) > SAV(C,V )(c′) if and only if NSAV(C∪D,V )(c) >
NSAV(C∪D,V )(c′).
PROOF. Observe that if two candidates c, c′ ∈ C have different SAV scores in (C, V ), then the absolute value of their score gap is at
least 1m−1 − 1m = 1m·(m−1) . In the election (C ∪D,V ), candidates in D are not approved by any vote in V . Therefore, the NSAV score
of a candidate c ∈ C in (C ∪D,V ) is its SAV score in (C, V ) minus∑v∈V,c6∈v 1m+|D|−|v| . Because |D| ≥ n ·m2 and |v| ≤ m− 1, it
holds that
∑
v∈V,c6∈v
1
m+|D|−|v| <
1
m·(m−1) . The lemma follows.
All hardness results for NSAV in this paper can be obtained by modifications of the reductions for the same problems under SAV by
adding dummy candidates as discussed above. Lemma 4.1 ensures the correctness of the reduction for NSAV.2
In the following, we divide our discussions into several subsections each of which is devoted to a concrete bribery problem.
4.1. Approval Addition
In this subsection, we study the atomic operation AppAdd. We show that among the five rules, AV is the only one which admits a
polynomial-time algorithm.
THEOREM 4.2. DAppAddB-AV is polynomial-time solvable.
PROOF. Let I = ((C, V ), J ⊆ C, k, `) be a given instance of DAppAddB-AV. Let m and n denote the number of candidates and
the number of votes, respectively. Consider first the case where there exists one candidate in J which is included in all votes. In this
case, we directly conclude that the given instance is a No-instance. Therefore, in the following let us assume that the above case does
not occur. We derive an algorithm as follows. First, we calculate the AV scores of all candidates, and find a candidate c∗ in J such that
AV(c∗) ≥ AV(c) for all c ∈ J . Let
C>(c∗) = {c ∈ C \ J : AV(c) > AV(c∗)}
be the set of all non-distinguished candidates who have strictly higher AV scores than that of c∗. If |C>(c∗)| ≥ k, we conclude that I is
a Yes-instance. Assume that this is not the case. As adding candidates into votes never decreases AV scores of any candidates, and it is
optimal to never add distinguished candidates into any vote, the question is now whether we can perform at most ` AppAdd operations
so that at least k candidates in C \ J have AV scores strictly greater than AV(c∗). For each candidate c ∈ C \ (J ∪ C>(c∗)), let
diff(c) = AV(c∗) + 1 − AV(c) be the minimum number of AppAdd operations needed to make c have AV score at least AV(c∗) + 1.
We order the candidates in C \ (J ∪ C>(c∗)) due to a non-decreasing order of diff(c), and let A be the set of the first k − |C>(c∗)|
candidates in the order. If
∑
c∈A diff(c) ≤ ` we conclude that I is a Yes-instance; otherwise, I is a No-instance. The reason is that in the
former case, for each candidate c ∈ A, we select arbitrarily AV(c∗) + 1− AV(c) votes in V \ V (c), add c in these votes, and decrease `
by AV(c∗)+1−AV(c) accordingly. After doing so for all candidates in A, it holds that ` ≥ 0, all candidates in A∪C>(c∗) have strictly
higher scores than that of c∗ and |A ∪ C>(c∗)| = k. If, however, ∑c∈A diff(c) > `, it takes more than ` AppAdd operations to make
that k non-distinguished candidates have score at least AV(c∗) + 1.
An important base for the correctness of the algorithm in the proof of Theorem 4.2 is that adding candidates in a vote does not change
the scores of other candidates which allows us to solve the instance greedily. However, this is not the case in SAV and NSAV voting,
where adding a candidate in a vote increases the score of this candidate but decreases the scores of other candidates in this vote. The
difference of the behavior between AV and SAV/NSAV essentially distinguishes the complexity of the bribery problems under these
rules.
THEOREM 4.3. DAppAddB-SAV and DAppAddB-NSAV are NP-hard even if k = 1.
2In all reductions, one can check that it is optimal to not add dummy candidates in the sets of approved candidates in votes.
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7PROOF. We give only the proof for SAV via a reduction from the RX3C problem. The reduction for NSAV is a modification of the
reduction for SAV based on Lemma 4.1.
Let (A,H) be an instance of RX3C where |A| = |H| = 3κ. We assume that κ > 4 and κ is even which does not change the
complexity of the problem.3 We create an instance denoted by ((C, V ), J ⊆ C, `, k) of DAppAddB-SAV as follows.
First, we create a set of 3κ candidates corresponding to A, one for each. Let c(a) denote the candidate created for a ∈ A and let
C(A) = {c(a) : a ∈ A}. In addition, we create a candidate denoted by p. We define C = C(A)∪{p}. We let J = C(A), set k = 1 and
` = κ. The multiset V of votes comprises of the following votes. First, we create 34κ
2 − 3κ votes each of which approves all candidates
except p. As we assumed that κ > 4 and κ is even, 34κ
2 − 3κ is a positive integer. In addition to the above votes, for each H ∈ H, we
create one vote v(H) which approves exactly the three candidates corresponding to its three elements, i.e., v(H) = {c(a) : a ∈ H}. This
completes the construction which can be done in polynomial time. Observe that in this election the SAV score of the non-distinguished
candidate p is 0 and that of everyone else is exactly(
3
4
κ2 − 3κ
)
· 1
3κ
+ 3× 1
3
=
κ
4
.
It remains to show the correctness of the reduction. Notice that as C = J ∪ {p} and k = 1, the question in consideration is equivalent
to whether we can make at most ` = κ additions so that {p} becomes the unique winning 1-committee.
(⇒) Assume thatH′ ⊆ H is an exact 3-set cover ofA. Consider the election after the following modifications: for eachH ∈ H′, add p
into the vote v(H), i.e., reset v(H) := v(H) ∪ {p}. As |H′| = κ, we make exactly κ additions. In this election, the votes approving p
are exactly those corresponding to H′. As each of these votes approves four candidates now and there are exactly κ of them, the SAV
score of p in this election is κ4 . For each candidate c(a) where a ∈ A, its SAV score decreases when we add p in some vote v(H) such
that a ∈ H ∈ H′ by 13 − 14 = 112 . AsH′ is an exact 3-set cover, there is exactly one such vote. Therefore, after the above modifications,
the SAV score of c(a) where a ∈ A decreases to κ4 − 112 , leading to {p} being the unique winning 1-committee.
(⇐) Assume that we can make at most ` = κ additions so that {p} is the unique winning 1-committee. Without loss of generality,
assume that exactly t votes among the 34κ
2 − 3κ votes approving J are modified. Observe that for these votes, we can only add p to
them. We claim first that t = 0 in fact. Assume, for the sake of contradiction that t > 0. Then, at most κ − 1 votes corresponding
to H can be modified. This implies that there exists at least one distinguished candidate c(a) where a ∈ A such that none of the three
votes v(H) such that a ∈ H ∈ H is modified. This further means that after the modifications, the candidate c(a) has SAV score(
3
4
κ2 − 3κ− t
)
· 1
3κ
+
t
3κ+ 1
+ 1 =
κ
4
− t
3κ
+
t
3κ+ 1
.
However, after the modifications the SAV score of p can be at most
t
3κ+ 1
+
κ− t
4
which is strictly smaller than that of c(a) for κ > 4. This contradicts that after the modifications, {p} is the unique winning 1-committee,
and our claim is proved.
Now we can assume that all modified votes are from those corresponding toH . Moreover, we can observe that when some v(H)where
H ∈ H, is supposed to be modified, it is optimal to add only p in the vote. Therefore, under this claim, exactly κ votes corresponding
to H are modified and each of them is modified by adding p. In this case, the SAV score of p is exactly κ4 after the modifications.
Because {p} is the unique winning 1-committee after the modifications, it must be that for every candidate c(a) where a ∈ A, at least
one vote v(H) such that a ∈ H is modified, implying that the subcollection corresponding to the set of modified votes is an exact 3-set
cover of A.
4.2. Approval Deletion
This section explores the atomic operation AppDel. For AV, we can obtain a polynomial-time solvability result again.
THEOREM 4.4. DAppDelB-AV is polynomial-time solvable.
PROOF. Given an instance ((C, V ), J ⊆ C, k, `) of DAppDelB-AV, we first check if there are at most k − 1 non-distinguished
candidates who are approved by at least one vote. If this is the case, we immediately conclude that the given instance is a No-instance.
Otherwise, our algorithm proceeds by exhaustively applying the following reduction rule. It should be pointed out that each application
of the following rule changes one vote in the election and, more importantly, throughout the application of the rule the AV scores of all
candidates are calculated with respect to the up-to-date election.
3If κ ≤ 4, the problem can be solved in polynomial time. If κ is odd, we can obtain an equivalent instance by making one copy of the given instance so that the original
instance has an exact cover of cardinality κ if and only if the new instance has an exact cover of cardinality 2κ. Note that we consider an element and its copy as they are
different so that each element in the universe still occurs in exactly three elements in the collection in the new instance.
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8Reduction Rule. Let c∗ ∈ J be a distinguished candidate who has the maximum AV score among all distinguished candidates, i.e.,
AV(c∗) ≥ AV(c) for all c ∈ J . If the number of non-distinguished candidates whose AV scores are at least AV(c∗) + 1 is at most k − 1,
remove c∗ from any arbitrary vote which approves c∗, and decrease ` by one.
After exhaustively applying the above reduction rule, we conclude that the given instance is a Yes-instance if and only if ` ≥ 0. The
polynomial-time solvability follows from that each application of the above reduction rule takes polynomial time, and we apply the rule
at most n ·m times, where n and m respectively denote the number of votes and the number of candidates in the given instance.
However, for SAV and NSAV, we again have hardness results.
THEOREM 4.5 (?). DAppDelB-SAV and DAppDelB-NSAV are NP-hard even when k = 1.
PROOF. We give only the proof for SAV. The proof for NSAV can be obtained by modification of the proof for SAV based on
Lemma 4.1. The proof is via a reduction from the RX3C problem. Let (A,H) be an RX3C instance such that |A| = |H| = 3κ > 0.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3, we assume that κ is even. We create an instance ((C, V ), J ⊆ C, `, k = 1) of DAppDelB-SAV as
follows. The candidate set is C = A ∪ {p} and J = A. The multiset V consists of the following votes. First, we create 92κ2 − 2κ votes
each of which approves exactly all the distinguished candidates. Note that as κ is a positive even integer, 92κ
2 − 2κ is a positive integer.
Let V ′ denote the multiset of these votes. In addition, for each H ∈ H, we create one vote v(H) approving p and the three candidates
corresponding to its three elements, i.e., v(H) = {p} ∪H . Let V (H) = {v(H) : H ∈ H}. So, we have V = V ′ ∪ V (H).
The construction can be completed in polynomial time. We prove the correctness of the reduction as follows. One can compute that
in the above constructed election, the SAV score of p is 3κ4 and the SAV score of everyone else is(
9
2
κ2 − 2κ
)
· 1
3κ
+
3
4
=
3
2
κ+
1
12
.
We set ` = 3κ.
(⇒) Assume that there is an exact 3-set cover H′ ⊆ H. Consider the election after the following modifications: for every H ∈ H′,
remove from v(H) the three candidates corresponding to the three elements in H . After the modifications, the score of p increases by
(1 − 14 )κ = 3κ4 , leading to a final SAV score 3κ2 . Moreover, the SAV score of each a ∈ A decreases by 14 , leading to a final SAV score
3κ
2 − 16 . Therefore, {p} becomes the unique winning 1-committee after the above modifications.
(⇐) Assume that we can perform at most ` = 3κ operations so that none of J = A is the winner. Three crucial observations are as
follows. First it is always optimal to remove only distinguished candidates from the votes. Based on this observation, we can see that it
is always optimal to modify only votes in V (H). The reason is that deleting candidates from some vote in V ′ in effect only redistributes
the SAV scores of distinguished candidates but deleting distinguished candidates from some vote in V (H) shifts the SAV scores of the
deleted candidates to the only non-distinguished candidate p. (More concretely, one can check that if there is a solution where some
vote in V ′ are modified we can obtain another solution where none of the votes in V ′ is modified.) The last observation is that when a
vote v(H) is determined to be modified, it is always optimal to remove the three candidates corresponding to elements in H . Based on
the above observations, we can assume that there is a solution where exactly κ votes in V (H) are modified by removing the distinguished
candidates from the votes. This means that after the modifications, the SAV score of p is exactly 32κ as in the above case. As none of
the distinguished candidate is a winner after the modification, for every a ∈ A, there must be at least one vote v(H), a ∈ H ∈ H,
which originally approves a but does not approve a after the modification. This implies that the subcollection corresponding to the set
of modified votes is an exact set cover of A.
Without stopping here, we also show W[1]-hardness results for SAV and NSAV with respect to the parameters ` and k. This holds
even when there is only one distinguished candidate. To compare, recall that Theorem 4.5 is based on a reduction where we want to
select only one winner but the number of distinguished candidates equals to the number of candidates minors one.
THEOREM 4.6 (?). DAppDelB-SAV and DAppDelB-NSAV are W[1]-hard with respect to both the parameter ` and the parameter k.
Moreover, the results hold even when |J | = 1.
PROOF. We prove the theorem via a reduction from the κ-CLIQUE problem restricted to regular graphs. Let I = (G = (U,A), κ) be
an instance of the κ-CLIQUE problem where every vertex in G has degree d for some positive integer d. Let m and n denote the number
of edges and the number of vertices in the graph G, respectively. We assume that κ and n are dividable by 6. This assumption does not
change the W[1]-hardness of the problem.4 We also assume that κ2 + 2d < 2m since otherwise the problem can be solved in FPT time
with respect to κ.5
We create an instance g(I) = ((C, V ), J ⊆ C, `, k) of DAppDelB-SAV as follows. For each vertex in G, we create a candidate. For
simplicity, we use the same symbol for both a vertex and the candidate created for this vertex. In addition, we create a candidate p which
4If this is not the case, we can change (G = (U,A), κ) into an equivalent instance (G′, 6κ) satisfying the assumption in polynomial time as follows. In particular, for
each vertex u ∈ U , we create a set B(u) of six vertices and let them form a clique in the graph G′. For each edge {u, u′} in the graph G, we add all missing edges
between B(u) and B(u′) so that B(u) ∪B(u′) form a clique in G′. It is easy to see that (G, κ) and (G′, 6κ) are equivalent.
5If 2m ≤ κ2 + 2d, from 2m = n · d and d ≥ 1, we can obtain that n ≤ κ2 + 2. In this case, we can solve the instance in FPT-time with respect to κ by enumerating
all κ-subsets of vertices and check if one of them is a clique.
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9is the only distinguished candidate. So, we have C = U ∪ {p} and J = {p}. We create two classes of votes. First, we group vertices
in G into n/3 groups of the same size. Let these groups be U1, U2, . . . , Ut where t = n/3. As n is dividable by 6, t is a positive integer.
For each group Ui, we create 2m−k
2−2d+2
2 votes each of which approves exactly the candidates in Ui. Let V (Ui) denote the multiset
of the votes created for Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Recall that we assumed that κ is even and 2m > κ2 + 2d. As a consequence, 2m−k2−2d+22 is a
positive integer. In addition, let V (U) =
⋃
1≤i≤t V (Ui) be the multiset of the union of the votes created for these groups. The second
class of votes correspond to edges in G. In particular, for each edge {u, u′} ∈ A we create one vote v({u, u′}) = {u, u′, p}. Finally, we
set k = κ and ` = k·(k−1)2 .
The reduction can be completed in polynomial time. It remains to show that I is a Yes-instance if and only if the g(I) is a Yes-instance.
We first compute the SAV scores of all candidates to ease the exposition of the correctness proof. The SAV score of p is m3 . The SAV
score of every candidate u ∈ U is
2m− k2 − 2d+ 2
2
× 1
3
+
d
3
=
2m− k2 + 2
6
.
As p has the maximum SAV score, p is included in all winning k-committees. Now we are ready to show the correctness.
(⇒) Assume that the graphG contains a cliqueK of size κ = k. LetA′ be set of the edges whose both endpoints are inK. Clearly,A′
consists of exactly k·(k−1)2 = ` edges. For each vote corresponding to an edge {u, u′} ∈ A′, we remove p from this vote. Let us calculate
the SAV scores after the above modifications. Modifying each vote as discussed above decreases the SAV score of p by 13 . Hence, the
SAV score of p decreases to
m
3
− |A
′|
3
=
2m− k · (k − 1)
6
=
2m− k2 + k
6
.
As K is a clique, each vertex u ∈ K is in exactly k − 1 edges in A′. Modifying each vote corresponding to an edge containing u
increases the SAV score of u by 12 − 13 = 16 . Modifying any vote corresponding to an edge not containing u does not change the SAV
score of u. Therefore, after the above modifications, the SAV score of u decreases to
2m− k2 + 2
6
+
k − 1
6
=
2m− k2 + k + 1
6
,
which is strictly greater than the SAV score of p. From |K| = k, we know that p cannot be in any winning k-committees after the above
modifications.
(⇐) Assume that the above constructed instance is a Yes-instance. We first have the following claim.
Claim. If the instance g(I) is a Yes-instance, then there is a solution where none of the votes in V (U) is changed.
For the sake of contradiction assume that in a solution we changed a vote v ∈ V (Ui) for some i ∈ [t]. After the change, there are
only three possibilities: (1) the vote approves two candidates; (2) the vote approves only one candidate; (3) the vote does not approve
any candidate. Note that changing any vote corresponding to an edge by removing p from the vote decreases the score gap between p
and every other candidate by 13 . However, changing v as in Case (1) decreases the score gap between p and two candidates by
1
3 , and
changing v as in Case (3) does not decrease the score gap between p and any other candidate (it even increases the score gap between p
and some other candidates). Therefore, if the vote v is changed as in Cases (1) or (3), we can obtain a new solution by not changing the
vote v but changing any vote corresponding to some edge that has not been changed (such a vote must exist because by our assumption
in the beginning of the proof it holds that ` = κ·(κ−1)2 <
κ2+2d
2 < m). In Case (2), the score gap between p and every other candidate
is decreased by at most 23 by using two deletion operations. In this case, we can obtain a new solution by not changing v but changing
two edge-votes by removing p that have not been changed in the solution (similar to the above reason, such two votes must exist). This
completes the proof for the claim.
Due to the above claim, we may assume that in a solution all changed votes are edge-votes. Similar to the proof of the above claim,
after changing a vote, there are three possibilities. However, it is easy to see that it does not make sense to change a vote so that the vote
does not approve anyone since doing so does not decrease the score gap between p and any other candidate. Therefore, we consider only
the first two cases. Additionally, it is optimal to full use the number of deletion operations. So, we assume that in the solution exactly
` = κ·(κ−1)2 votes are changed. Moreover, if an edge-vote is determined to be changed, it only makes sense to remove p from the vote.
Let t1 and t2 respectively denote the numbers of votes that are changed in the solution in a way as in Cases (1) and (2). Then, it holds
that
2t1 + t2 =
κ · (κ− 1)
2
.
As p is removed in all changed votes, the SAV score of p decreases by t1+t23 , leading to a final SAV score
m
3
− t1 + t2
3
=
m+ t1
3
− κ · (κ− 1)
6
.
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Changing a vote by removing some candidates in effect shifts the scores of the removed candidates received from the vote to the
candidates that are still approved in the vote. Let K be the set of candidates whose SAV scores increase after the changes in the solution.
The total increase of the SAV scores of the candidates in K is exactly
2t1
3
+
t2
3
=
κ · (κ− 1)
6
.
If after the changes in the solution the candidate p is not in any winning k-committee, there must be a set K ′ ⊆ K of at least k = κ
candidates whose SAV scores in the final election are strictly greater than that of p. Given that the total increase of the SAV scores of
these candidates can be at most κ·(κ−1)6 , we know that among candidates in K
′, the SAV score of the one with the lowest SAV score in
the final election increases by at most κ−16 , leading to a final SAV score at most
2m− k2 + 2
6
+
k − 1
6
=
2m− k2 + k + 1
6
.
As p has a strictly lower SAV score than that of this candidate, it holds that
m+ t1
3
− κ · (κ− 1)
6
<
2m− k2 + k + 1
6
,
implying that t1 = 0, and hence t2 = ` =
κ·(κ−1)
2 . We know then that the SAV score of p in the final election is
m
3 − κ·(κ−1)6 . This
further means that by changing ` edge-votes in the solution, the SAV score of each candidate in K ′ increases by at least κ·(κ−1)6 . Due
to the above construction and the fact that changing an edge-vote v({u, u′}) increases the SAV scores of both u and v by exactly 16 , we
know that for every candidate in K ′, the corresponding vertex is incident to at least κ−1 edges whose corresponding votes are changed.
Given that exactly ` = κ·(κ−1)2 edge-votes are changed in the solution, it follows that the set of vertices corresponding to K
′ is a clique
in the graph G.
4.3. Vote Change
From this section, we study vote-level operations. We show that problems associated with these operations are generally NP-hard or
W[1]-hard even in some special cases, and this is already the case for AV.
THEOREM 4.7 (?). r-DVCB-AV for all possible values of r ≥ 4 are NP-hard even when k = 1.
PROOF. We prove the theorem via a reduction from the RX3C problem. Let (A,H) be an RX3C instance where |A| = |H| = 3κ > 0.
We create an instance ((C, V ), J ⊆ C, `, k) of r-DVCB-AV as follows, where r is an integer greater than 3. The candidate set is
C = A∪ {p} with J = A being the set of distinguished candidates. So, we have 3κ+1 candidates in total. Now we construct the votes
in V . First, for each a ∈ A, we create κ−3 votes each of which approves only a. Then, for each H ∈ H we create one vote v(H) which
approves exactly the three candidates in H , i.e., v(H) = H . In addition, we set ` = κ and k = 1. It is easy to see that p has AV score 0
and each a ∈ A has AV score (κ− 3) + 3 = κ.
The reduction clearly takes polynomial time. In the following, we show that the given RX3C instance is a Yes-instance if and only if
the constructed r-DVCB-AV instance is a Yes-instance.
(⇒) Assume that there is an exact set cover H′ ⊆ H of A. We change all the κ votes corresponding to the κ elements of H′ so that
after the change all of them approve only p. Clearly, in the new election, p receives κ approvals. As H′ is an exact set cover, for every
candidate a ∈ A, there is exactly one vote which originally approves a but does not approve a after the changes. Therefore, in the new
election, every candidate a ∈ A receives κ− 1 approvals, implying that none of J can be a winner.
(⇐) Assume that we can change at most ` votes so that none of J is a winner. This is equivalent that p is the unique winner after the
changes. Observe first that if a certain vote is determined to be changed, then it is always optimal to change it so that after the change this
vote approves only p. (Recall that r ≥ 4 and every vote approves at most three candidates originally, therefore any vote can be changed
into {p} without disobeying the distance restriction) The second observation is that if the constructed instance is a Yes-instance, there
is at least one solution where exactly ` votes are changed and, moreover, all changed votes are from those corresponding to H. (If
some vote corresponding to some a ∈ A is changed, we can obtain another solution by not changing this vote but changing any vote
corresponding to some H ∈ H which has not been changed in the solution). We assume such a solution. Based on the two observations,
we know that after changing ` votes in the solution of the above constructed instance the AV score of p is exactly ` = κ. This means that
for every a ∈ A, there is at least one vote v(H), H ∈ H, which originally approves a but is changed so that the vote only approves p
after the change. Due to the above construction, a vote v(H), H ∈ H, originally approves a if and only if a ∈ H . As this holds for all
a ∈ A, the subcollection corresponding to the solution is an exact set cover of A.
In the proof of Theorem 4.7, the number of distinguished candidates is again not bounded by a constant. One may wonder whether
we have FPT algorithms with respect to the number of distinguished candidates, or the combined parameter of k and |J |. The next result
destroys this hope.
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THEOREM 4.8. r-DVCB-AV for all possible values of r ≥ 3 is W[1]-hard with respect to the parameters ` and k. This holds even
when |J | = 1.
PROOF. We prove the theorem via a reduction from the κ-CLIQUE problem restricted to regular graphs. Let (G = (U,A), κ) be an
instance of the κ-CLIQUE probelm where every vertex in G has degree exactly d for some positive integer d. Without loss of generality,
we assume that κ ≥ 2. Moreover, we assume that d > κ3 since otherwise the instance can be solved in FPT time with respect to κ.
Let r be an integer at least 3. We construct an r-DVCB-AV instance ((C, V ), J ⊆ C, `, k) as follows. The candidate set is C = U ∪{p}
where p 6∈ U is the only distinguished candidate, i.e., J = {p}. We create m votes corresponding to the edges in G, where m is
the number of vertices in G. In particular, for each edge {u, u′} ∈ A, we create a vote approving all candidates except u and u′. In
addition, we create d + 1 − (κ−1)·(κ+2)2 votes approving all candidates except p. Note that under our assumption d > κ3 and κ ≥ 2,
d+1− (κ−1)·(κ+2)2 is a positive integer. We complete the construction by setting ` = κ·(κ−1)2 and k = κ, i.e., we are allowed to change
at most κ·(κ−1)2 votes and we aim to select exactly κ winners.
Clearly, the above construction can be done in polynomial time. It remains to analyze the correctness of the reduction. Let’s first
consider the AV scores of the candidates. The AV score of p is
AV(p) = m,
and the AV score of every other candidate u ∈ U is
AV(u) =
(
d+ 1− (κ− 1) · (κ+ 2)
2
)
+ (m− d)
= 1 +m− (κ− 1) · (κ+ 2)
2
.
Under the assumption κ ≥ 2, it holds that AV(u) < AV(p) for every candidate u ∈ U .
(⇒) Assume that there is a clique U ′ ⊆ U of size κ in the graph G. We modify all votes corresponding to edges between vertices in
the clique U ′, i.e., all edges in G[U ′]. Clearly, there are exactly κ·(κ−1)2 = ` such votes. We modify them so that all candidates except p
are approved in these votes. The distance between each new vote and its original vote is exactly 3 which does not disobey the distance
restriction. As a vote corresponding to some edge {u, u′} initially approves p but approves neither u nor u′, after modifying this vote,
the AV score of p decreases by one and the AV scores of both u and v increase by one. So, after all these modifications the AV score
of p becomes
m− κ · (κ− 1)
2
.
For each u ∈ U ′, as there are exactly κ− 1 edges incident to u in G[U ′], after modifying the above ` votes, the AV score of u becomes
AV(u) + κ− 1 = 1 +m− κ · (κ− 1)
2
,
strictly greater than the final score of p, implying that p cannot be in any winning k-committees after all the modifications.
(⇐) Assume that we can change at most ` = κ·(κ−1)2 votes so that p is not included in any winning k-committee. Observe that it
is always better to modify votes corresponding to the edges than those who already disapprove p and approve all the other candidates.
Moreover, observe that it optimal to full use the number of operations, and when a vote corresponding to an edge is determined to be
modified, it is optimal to change it so that the vote approves all candidates except the distinguished candidate p. The final AV score of p
is then determined:
AV(p)− ` = m− κ · (κ− 1)
2
.
This implies that after the changes, there must be at least k candidates whose AV scores increase by at least κ − 1 each. Note that
when a vote corresponding to some edge {u, u′} is changed, only the AV scores of u and u′ increase, each by one. Let U be the set of
candidates whose scores are increased after the changes of the votes in a solution. Therefore, U consists of the vertices spanned by all
edges whose corresponding votes are changed. Due to the above analysis, changing ` = κ·(κ−1)2 edge-votes can increase the total SAV
scores of candidates U by at most κ · (κ− 1). This directly implies that U consists of exactly k candidates. Because κ·(κ−1)2 edges span
exactly k vertices if and only if the set of spanned vertices is a clique, we know that the given instance of the κ-CLIQUE problem is a
Yes-instance since U is a clique in G.
For SAV and NSAV, we have the following hardness result.
THEOREM 4.9. r-DVCB-SAV and r-VC-NSAV for all integers r ≥ 4 are NP-hard. This holds even if k = 1.
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PROOF. We give only the detailed proof for SAV. The proof for NSAV can be obtained by utilizing Lemma 4.1.
The proof for SAV is similar to the one of Theorem 4.7. In particular, our proof is based on a reduction from the RX3C problem.
Let (A,H) be an instance of the RX3C problem where |A| = |H| = κ > 0. We create an instance ((C, V ), J ⊆ C, `, k = 1) of
r-DVCB-SAV as follows. The candidate set is A ∪ {p} with J = A being the set of distinguished candidates. So, we have 3κ + 1
candidates in total. We create the following votes. For each a ∈ A, we create κ− 1 votes each of which approves only a. In addition, for
each H ∈ H, we create one vote v(H) = H which approves exactly the three candidates corresponding to the elements in H . We set
` = κ and k = 1. It is easy to see that the SAV score of p is 0, and the SAV score of every candidate a ∈ A is (κ− 1) + 3× 13 = κ. The
construction clearly can be done in polynomial time. In the following, we show that for all possible values of r ≥ 4, the given RX3C
instance is a Yes-instance if and only if the above constructed instance is a Yes-instance.
(⇒) Assume that there is an exact set cover H′ ⊆ H. We change the κ votes corresponding to H′ so that they approve only the
candidate p after the changes. The Hamming distance between the new vote and its original vote is at most r for any r ≥ 3. Then, it is
fairly easy to check that in the new election the SAV score of p is κ and the SAV score of every candidate a ∈ A is κ− 13 , implying that
none of J is a winner in the new election.
(⇐) Suppose that we can change at most ` = κ votes so that none of J is a winner. Similar to the proof in Theorem 4.7, we observe
that if a certain vote is determined to be changed, it is always optimal to change it so that the vote only approves the candidate p and,
moreover, there is a solution where exactly ` votes are changed. Due to these observations, we know that in the final election, p has SAV
score κ. This implies that for every candidate a ∈ A, at least one vote approving a is changed. As we change ` = κ votes and |A| = 3κ,
it holds that all the κ changed votes are from those corresponding to H and, moreover, the subcollection corresponding to the changed
votes must be an exact set cover of A.
Regarding fixed-parameter intractability results, we have the following theorem.
THEOREM 4.10 (?). r-DVCB-SAV and r-DVCB-NSAV for all possible values of r ≥ 1 are W[1]-hard with respect to both the
parameter ` and the parameter k. The results holds even when |J | = 1.
PROOF. We provide only the proof for SAV. The proof for NSAV can be obtained from the following proof by introducing a number
of dummy candidates in a way as described in Lemma 4.1. Our proof is based on a reduction from the κ-CLIQUE problem on regular
graphs. Let r be a fixed positive integer. Let (G = (U,A), κ) be an instance of the κ-CLIQUE problem where G is a d-regular graph for
some positive integer d. In this proof, we assume that κ is odd. This assumption does not change the W[1]-hardness of the problem.6
Let m = |A| denote the number of edges in G. In addition, we assume that m > d+ κ2 + κ · r, d ≥ κ·(κ−1)2 , and κ > 3 which does not
change the W[1]-hardness of the problem too. (If they are not satisfied the problem can be solved in FPT time with respect to κ [Eppstein
et al. 2013]. Note also that as r is not in the input, we can consider it as a constant) Now we create an instance ((C, V ), J ⊆ C, `, k) of
r-DVDCB-SAV as follows.
The candidate set C consists of the following candidates. First, we create a candidate p which is the only distinguished candidate, i.e.,
J = {p}. Then, we create a number of candidates corresponding to vertices and edges of the graph G. Let
t = m− d− κ · (κ− 3)
2
− κ− 1
2
· (r + 2).
Due to the above assumptions, we know that t is a positive integer. For each vertex u ∈ U , we first create one candidate c(u) and then
create t subsets C(u, 1), C(u, 2), . . . , C(u, t) of dummy candidates with each subset consists of exactly r+1 candidates. For each edge
{u, u′} ∈ A, we create a set C({u, u′}) of r − 1 dummy candidates. Now we describe the votes in V . In general, the votes are created
so that all dummy candidates have no chance to be winners and, moreover, we can change votes corresponding to edges included in a
clique of size κ by removing dummy candidates and p in the votes so that the candidates corresponding to the clique have strictly higher
SAV score than that of p after the changes. In particular, for each vertex u ∈ U , we create t votes v(u, 1), v(u, 2), . . . , v(u, t) such that
v(u, i) = {c(u)}∪C(u, i), where i ∈ [t]. Moreover, for each edge {u, u′}, we create one vote v({u, u′}) = {c(u), c(u′), p}∪C({u, u′}).
We complete the reduction by setting ` = κ·(κ−1)2 and k = κ, i.e., we are aiming to select exactly κ winners and we are allowed to
change at most κ·(κ−1)2 votes.
The reduction clearly can be finished in polynomial time. It remains to show the correctness of the reduction. It is helpful to first
analyze the SAV scores of the candidates. Observe first that each of the above constructed vote approves r + 2 candidates. As each
dummy candidate is approved by exactly one vote, the SAV score of each dummy candidate is 1r+2 . The SAV score of p is
m
r+2 . For
each vertex u ∈ U , the SAV score of c(u) is d+tr+2 .
6To show the W[1]-hardness of the κ-CLIQUE problem on regular graphs, Cai [2008] gave a polynomial-time reduction to translate an instance of the κ-CLIQUE problem
in general into an equivalent instance of the same problem but with the input graph being a regular graph. Importantly, the parameters in the two instances are the same.
Therefore, to show that the assumption does not change the W[1]-hardness of the κ-CLIQUE problem restricted to regular graphs, it suffices to show that the assumption
does not change the W[1]-hardness of the κ-CLIQUE problem in general. To this end, for an instance of the κ-CLIQUE problem where κ is even, we add to the graph one
more vertex which is adjacent to all vertices. It is easy to see that the original instance has a clique of size κ if and only if the new graph with the additional vertex has a
clique of size κ+ 1.
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(⇒) Assume that there is a clique K ⊆ U of size κ in G. Let A′ = {{u, u′} ∈ A : {u, u′} ⊆ K} be the set of edges in the subgraph
induced by K. Obviously, |A′| = κ·(κ−1)2 . We change the ` = κ·(κ−1)2 votes corresponding to A′ by removing p and all dummy
candidates from these votes. Precisely, for each {u, u′} ∈ A′, we change the vote v({u, u′}) so that the vote approves only the two
candidates c(u) and c(u′) after the change. The distance between the original and the new votes is r. Now we analyze the SAV scores
of the candidates after the above changes. As changing each vote decreases the SAV score of p by 1r+2 , the SAV score of p becomes
sc(p) =
m− κ·(κ−1)2
r + 2
after the changes. The SAV score of each dummy candidate is at most 1r+2 after the changes. As K is a clique, each u ∈ K is incident
to exactly κ − 1 edges in A′. Due to the above construction, there are exactly κ − 1 votes approving c(u) being changed. As changing
each vote approving c(u) as discussed above increases the SAV score of c(u) by 12 − 1r+2 , the SAV score of c(u) becomes
d+ t
r + 2
+ (κ− 1) ·
(
1
2
− 1
r + 2
)
= sc(p) +
1
r + 2
,
which is strictly greater than the SAV score of p. Therefore, after the above changes, p cannot be in any winning k-committees.
(⇐) Assume that the above constructed instance of r-DVDCB-SAV is a Yes-instance. Observe first that there is a solution where none
of the votes corresponding to U is changed. The reason is as follows. If we have a solution where some vote corresponding to a vertex
u ∈ U is changed, then we can obtain another solution by not changing this vote but changing a vote corresponding to an edge which
is incident to the vertex u and has not been changed in the solution (such a vote must exist as we assumed that d > ` = κ·(κ−1)2 ). In
addition, if a vote v({u, u′}) corresponding to an edge {u, u′} is determined to be changed, removing the r − 1 dummy candidates and
the distinguished candidate p is an optimal strategy. Changing a vote in this way decreases the SAV score of p as much as possible and
increases the score of non-dummy candidates as much as possible. Moreover, observe that it is always better to change exactly ` votes
than changing less than ` votes. Due to these observations, there is a solution where exactly ` = κ·(κ−1)2 votes corresponding to ` edges
in A are changed by removing the dummy candidates and p. This implies that after the votes are changed in the solution, the SAV score
of p is sc(p) as defined above. Let K be the set of vertices in the edges corresponding to the votes changed in the solution. Clearly, we
have |K| ≥ κ. As changing one vote v({u, u′}) where {u, u′} ∈ A in the solution in effect shifts the total scores of C({u, u′}) ∪ {p}
received from this vote, which equals to rr+2 , to c(u) and c(u
′), the total increase of the SAV score of candidates corresponding to K is
r
r+2 ·` = rr+2 · κ·(κ−1)2 , leading to an average increase of SAV score of candidates corresponding toK being
r
r+2 ·κ·(κ−1)2
|K| . As the absolute
value of the SAV score difference between every two candidates is at least 1r+2 , there must be at least k candidates corresponding to k
vertices in K whose SAV scores increase by at least
sc(p) +
1
r + 2
− d+ t
r + 2
=
r · (κ− 1)
2(r + 2)
after the changes in the solution. This is possible only when |K| = κ, which further implies that K is a clique in G.
4.4. Vote Addition Change
In the previous section, we showed that r-DVCB-AV is already NP-hard when k = 1. However, this is not the case for vote-level
addition operation.
THEOREM 4.11. r-DVACB-AV for all possible values of r is polynomial-time solvable if k = 1.
PROOF. Let ((C, V ), J ⊆ C, k = 1, `) be an instance of r-DVACB-AV, where r is a non-negative integer. If r = 0, we solve the
instance by checking if there is one non-distinguished candidate which has a strictly greater AV score than that of all distinguished
candidates, which can be done in polynomial time. So, let us assume that r is a positive integer. Let n = |V | denote the number of
votes in the given instance. In addition, let s be the maximum AV score of the distinguished candidates, i.e., for all c ∈ J it holds that
AV(c) ≤ s and there is at least one candidate c′ ∈ J such that AV(c′) = s. Finally, let c∗ ∈ C \ J be a candidate with the maximum AV
score among all those in C \ J . Our algorithm goes as follows. If c∗ already has AV score at least s+ 1, we return “Yes”. Otherwise, if
AV(c∗) +min{`, n− |V (c∗)|} ≥ s+ 1, we return “Yes” too. The reason is that in this case we can select arbitrarily min{`, n} votes in
V \V (c∗) and add c∗ into each of the selected votes so that the AV score of c∗ is s+1. If none of the above two cases occurs, we return
“No”.
However, we have fixed-parameter intractable result when k and ` are parameters even when other parameters are small constants.
THEOREM 4.12 (?). r-DVACB-AV for all integers r ≥ 2 is W[1]-hard with respect to the parameters ` and k. Moreover, this holds
even when |J | = 1.
PROOF. We prove the theorem via a reduction from the κ-CLIQUE problem restricted to regular graphs. Let I = ((G = (U,A)), κ)
be an instance of the κ-CLIQUE problem where G is a d-regular graph. We assume that m > d > κ > 2 since otherwise the problem
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can be solved in FPT time with respect to κ [Eppstein et al. 2013]. Let m be the number of edges in the graph G. We create an
instance g(I) = ((C, V ), J ⊆ C, `, k) of r-DVACB-AV as follows. The candidate set is C = U ∪{p} with J = {p} being the singleton
of the distinguished candidate. Regarding the votes, we first create d − κ + 2 votes each of which approves all candidates except
the distinguished candidate p. Due to the above assumption, d − κ + 2 is a positive integer. In addition, for each edge {u, u′} ∈ A,
we create one vote v({u, u′}) approving all candidates except u and u′, i.e., v({u, u′}) = (U ∪ {p}) \ {u, u′}. We set k = κ and
` = κ·(κ−1)2 . It is fairly easy to check that in the election, the AV score of p is m and the AV score of every candidate u ∈ U is
(d− κ+ 2) + (m− d) = m− κ+ 2, which is a positive integer smaller than the AV score of p due to the above assumption. Hence, p
must be included in all winning k-committees in the current election. The construction clearly can be done in polynomial time. In the
following, we show that for all possible values of r ≥ 2, the instance I is a Yes-instance if and only if g(I) is a Yes-instance.
(⇒) Assume that there is a clique K ⊆ U of size κ in the graph G. Let A′ = {e ∈ A : e ⊆ K} be the set of edges whose both
endpoints are in K. As K is a clique, we know that |A′| = κ·(κ−1)2 = `. We change the ` votes corresponding to A′ so that they approve
all candidates after the changes. Clearly, the distance between a vote v({u, u′}) and the new vote after changing v({u, u′}) in the above
way is exactly 2. After the changes, the AV score of p remains as the same. However, for every candidate u ∈ K, there are exactly κ− 1
votes which do not approve u originally but are changed so that they approve all candidates including u. Therefore, the AV score of
every candidate in K after the above changes is (m− κ+ 2) + (κ− 1) = m+ 1, implying that K is the unique winning k-committee.
As p 6∈ K, the instance g(I) is a Yes-instance.
(⇐) Assume that we can change at most ` votes so that p is not in any winning k-committee. Observe that there must be a solution
where all changed votes are from those corresponding to A. Moreover, if a vote corresponding to an edge {u, u′} is determined to be
changed, it is optimal to change it by adding the two candidates u and u′ into the vote. Let A′ be the set of edges corresponding to the
votes that are changed in such a solution. In addition, let K denote the set of vertices that are incident to at least one edge in A′. Due
to the above observation, we know that in the final election the AV scores of p and those in U \K remain unchanged. This implies that
|K| ≥ k and, moreover, there exists a subset K ′ ⊆ K of k candidates such that for every u ∈ K ′ at least κ − 1 votes which do not
approve u originally are changed in the solution. Due to the above construction, this is equivalent that every candidate-vertex in K ′ is
incident to at least κ− 1 edges in A′. Given that |A′| = κ·(κ−1)2 , this is possible only when K ′ = k and K is a clique of G.
Unlike, AV, for SAV and NSAV, we already have NP-hardness even when both k and r are equal to 1.
THEOREM 4.13 (?). r-DVACB-SAV and r-DVACB-NSAV for all integers r ≥ 1 are NP-hard. Moreover, this holds even when k = 1.
PROOF. We prove the theorem via a reduction from the RX3C problem. Let (A,H) be an RX3C instance such that |A| = |H| =
3κ > 0. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3, we assume that κ > 4 and κ is even. Let r ≥ 1 be an integer. We construct an instance
((C, V ), J ⊆ C, `, k) of r-DVACB-SAV as follows. The candidate set is C = A ∪ {p} and we define J = A as the set of distinguished
candidates. Regarding the votes, we first create 3κ
2
4 −3κ votes each of which approves all candidates except p. Let V ′ denote the multiset
of these votes. As we assumed that κ is a positive even integer greater than 4, 3κ
2
4 − 3κ is also a positive integer. In addition, for each
H ∈ H, we create one vote v(H) which approves exactly the three elements inH . Let V (H) = {v(H) : H ∈ H}. Let V = V ′∪V (H).
We complete the reduction by setting k = 1 and ` = κ.
The reduction clearly takes polynomial time. In the following, we show that the given RX3C instance is a Yes-instance sif and only if
the above constructed instance is a Yes-instance. For ease of exposition, let us first calculate the SAV scores of all candidates. The SAV
score of p is clearly 0. For each a ∈ A, its SAV score is(
3κ2
4
− 3κ
)
· 1
3κ
+ 1 =
κ
4
.
(⇒) Let H′ ⊆ H be an exact 3-set cover of A. Let V (H′) = {v(H) : H ∈ H′} be the set of votes corresponding to H′. Consider
the new election obtained from the original one by changing each vote in V (H′) by adding p in the approved candidates set. In the new
election, the SAV score of p increases to κ4 . As H′ is an exact 3-set cover, for each a ∈ A, there is exactly one vote in V (H′) which
approves a. Changing this vote decreases the SAV score of a by 13 − 14 = 112 . Therefore, after all changes, the SAV score of every
candidate a ∈ A decreases to κ4 − 112 , implying that p becomes the unique winner after the changes. So, the constructed instance is a
Yes-instance.
(⇐) Assume that we can change at most ` = κ votes so that p becomes the unique winner. Observe that there exists an optimal
solution where all changed votes are from V (H). The reason is that changing any vote in V ′ only increases the SAV score of p by
1
3κ − 13κ+1 but changing any vote in V (H) by adding p increases the SAV score of p by 14 which is greater than 13κ − 13κ+1 (changing
such a vote also decreases the scores of the distinguished candidates in the vote). Therefore, if there is an optimal solution which contains
a vote in V ′, we can obtain another optimal solution by replacing changing this vote with changing some vote in V (H) which has not
been changed. Moreover, if a vote in V (H) is determined to be changed, it is always optimal to change the vote by only adding p,
because our goal is to increase the score of p as much as possible and decrease the scores of other candidates as much as possible,.
Third, it is optimal to full use the number of operations. Given these observations, we assume a solution where exactly ` = κ votes
in V (H) are changed by adding p into the votes. This means that after the changes in the solution, the SAV score of p becomes κ4 . If p
is the unique winner in the final election, for every candidate a ∈ A, at least one vote which approves a is changed in the solution. Due
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to the construction, a vote v(H) approves a candidate a if and only if a ∈ H . Therefore, the subcollection corresponding to the set of
changed votes covers A. As we change exactly ` = κ votes, this subcollection must be an exact cover of A and hence the given RX3C
instance is a Yes-instance.
4.5. Vote Deletion Change
For the vote-level deletion operation, we have an NP-hardness result for AV even when we want to elect only one winner.
THEOREM 4.14 (?). r-DVDCB-AV is NP-hard for all possible integers r ≥ 3 even when k = 1.
PROOF. We prove the theorem via a reduction from the RX3C problem. Given an RX3C instance I = (A,H) such that |A| = |H| =
3κ > 0, we create an instance g(I) of r-DVDCB-AV as follows, where r is an integer larger than 2. The candidate set is A ∪ {p} with
J = A being the set of distinguished candidates. Regarding the votes, we first create three votes each of which approves only the non-
distinguished candidate p. Then, for each H ∈ H, we create one vote v(H) approving candidates corresponding to the three elements
in H . We set ` = κ and k = 1. In the election, the AV scores of all candidates are 3. The construction can be done in polynomial time.
In the following, we show that I is a Yes-instance if and only if g(I) is a Yes-instance.
(⇒) Assume that there is an exact set cover H′ ⊆ H. We change the votes corresponding to H′ so that they do not approve any
candidates after the changes. As H′ is an exact set cover, for every candidate a ∈ A there is exactly one vote approving a that is
changed. So, the AV score of a becomes 3 − 1 = 2 after the above changes. As none of the votes corresponding to H approves p
originally, the AV score of p remains as 3 after the above changes. This means that p becomes the unique winner after the above changes
and hence g(I) is a Yes-instance.
(⇐) Assume that we can change at most ` = κ votes so that none of J is a winner. Observe that there must be a solution where all
changed votes are from those corresponding toH. Therefore, we know that in the final election the AV score of p is 3. This implies that
for every a ∈ A, at least one vote which approves a must be changed. Due to the above construction, we know that the subcollection
corresponding to the changed votes must be a set cover of A. Given that we can change at most ` = κ votes, the subcollection must be
an exact set cover.
Next, we show that if every vote is only allowed to delete at most one approved candidate, the problem becomes polynomial-time
solvable, regardless of the values of k.
THEOREM 4.15. r-DVDCB-AV is polynomial-time solvable if r = 1.
PROOF. We solve the problem by reducing it to the maximum matching problem which is polynomial-time solvable [Edmonds 1965;
Galil 1986]. Let ((C, V ), J ⊆ C, k, `) be an instance of r-DVDCB-AV. We calculate the AV scores of all non-distinguished candidates
and order them according to their scores from the highest to the lowest with ties being broken arbitrarily. Let s denote the AV score
of the k-th candidate in the order. Our goal is to select at most ` votes and remove some distinguished candidates from these votes,
one from each, so that the AV score of every distinguished candidate is at most s − 1. Let J ′ be the set of distinguished candidates
who have AV scores at least s. We create a bipartite graph. Particularly, we create a vertex for each distinguished candidate in J ′, and
create a vertex for each vote which approves at least one candidate in J ′. We connect a vote-vertex with a candidate-vertex if and only
if the vote approves this candidate. Then, we do the following. For each distinguished candidate c ∈ J ′ of score AV(c) ≥ s + 1, we
create AV(c) − s copies of the corresponding vertex (each copy also has the same neighbors as the original vertex). Note that we can
immediately conclude that the given instance is a No-instance if
∑
c∈J′(AV(c)− s+ 1) > `. So, let us assume that this is not the case.
Then, we calculate a maximum matching. If all candidate-vertices and all of their copies are saturated by the matching, we conclude
that the instance is a Yes-instance; otherwise, the instance is a No-instance.
THEOREM 4.16 (?). r-DVDCB-SAV and r-DVDCB-NSAV are NP-hard for all possible integers r ≥ 3 even when k = 1 and every
voter approves at most three candidates.
PROOF. We give only the proof for SAV. The proof for NSAV is a slight modification of the following proof based on Lemma 4.1.
Our proof is based on a reduction from the RX3C problem. Let I = (A,H) be an RX3C instance such that |A| = |H| = 3κ > 0.
Let r be an integer at least 3. We create an instance g(I) of r-DVDCB-SAV as follows. For each a ∈ A, we create a candidate which
is still denoted by a for simplicity. In addition, we create a set P = {p1, p2, . . . , pr+1} of r + 1 candidates. The votes are as follows.
We create one vote v = P . Besides to this vote, for each H ∈ H, we create one vote v(H) which approves exactly the three candidates
in H . Let V (H) = {v(H) : H ∈ H} be the set of votes corresponding to the collectionH. Finally, we set k = 1, J = A, and ` = κ+1.
The above construction clearly can be done in polynomial time. In the following, we prove that I is a Yes-instance if and only if the
above constructed instance g(I) is a Yes-instance. Before proceeding further, let first calculate the SAV scores of all candidates. The
SAV score of every candidate in P is 1r+1 ≤ 14 . The SAV score of every candidate a ∈ A is 1.
(⇒) Assume that H′ ⊆ H is an exact set cover of A. Let V (H′) = {v(H) : H ∈ H′} be the set of votes corresponding to H′. We
change the κ votes in V (H′) so that they do not approve any candidate after the change, and change v = P into v′ = {p1}. Clearly,
the distance between each changed vote and the new vote is at most r. As H′ is an exact set cover, for every candidate a ∈ A, there
is exactly one v(H) ∈ V (H′), a ∈ H ∈ H′, which approves a originally. Therefore, the above changes make the SAV score of a be
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decreased by exactly 13 , leading to a final SAV score 1 − 13 = 23 . The SAV score of p1, however, becomes 1 after the above changes,
which excluding all distinguished candidates from being a winner.
(⇐) Assume that we can change at most ` = κ+ 1 votes so that none of the distinguished candidates is a winner. Let E′ denote the
final election after changing the votes in a fixed solution. Then, at least one candidate from P must have a strictly higher SAV score
than anyone in J . Due to symmetry, we can assume that p1 ∈ P is such a candidate. Then, observe that there must be a solution where
the vote v = P is changed into a vote which approves only p1. The reason is that changing this vote this way increases the score gap
between p1 and all candidates in P by 1− 1r+1 ≥ 34 , but changing any other vote only increases the score gap by at most 13 . Therefore,
we know that in the final election E′ the SAV score of p1 is 1. As p1 has a strictly higher SAV score than anyone else in E′, for every
a ∈ A there must be at least one vote approving a which is changed. This means that the subcollection corresponding to the changed
votes inH must be a set cover of A. Because that we change at most κ votes in V (H), each a must occurs in exactly one element in the
subcollection, and hence the subcollection is an exact set cover and the given instance I is a Yes-instance.
Next, we show that for SAV and NSAV, destructive bribery with the vote deletion operation is W[1]-hard.
THEOREM 4.17 (?). r-DVDCB-SAV and r-DVDCB-NSAV for all possible values of r ≥ 1 are W[1]-hard with respect to both `
and k. This holds even when |J | = 1.
PROOF. The proof is exactly the one for Theorem 4.10. The reason is that, as discussed in the proof of Theorem 4.10, when a vote is
determined to be changed, an optimal strategy is to remove the dummy candidates and the distinguished candidate from the vote. The
arguments for the correctness are the same.
5. FIXED-PARAMETER TRACTABILITY
In the previous sections, we have obtained many intractability results and a few polynomial-time solvability results in some special cases.
This section aims to explore fixed-parameter tractable algorithms with respect to three natural parameters: the number of candidates m,
the number of voters n, and the number of distinguished candidates |J |. As |J | ≤ m in each problem instance studied in this paper, any
FPT-algorithm with respect to |J | carries over to m directly. These three parameters are relevant to many real-world applications and
have received extensive study [Chen et al. 2017; Bredereck et al. 2015; Yang 2014; Zhou et al. 2019; Bachmeier et al. 2019].
We have shown that r-VC-AV and r-VAC-AV are NP-hard even when there is only one distinguished candidate but left whether
r-VDC-AV is also NP-hard in this case unexplored in the previous sections. We answer this question now. Interestingly, we show that
r-VDC-AV is FPT with respect to |J |, standing in a sharp contrast to the NP-hardness of the other two problems even when |J | = 1.
THEOREM 5.1. r-DVDCB-AV for all possible values of r is FPT with respect to the number of distinguished candidates.
PROOF. Let ((C, V ), J ⊆ C, k, `) be an instance of r-DVDCB-AV where r is a non-negative integer. Our FPT-algorithm is based
on integer-linear programming (ILP) formulation. For each subset A ⊆ J , let V (A) = {v ∈ V : v ∩ J = A} denote the multiset of
votes approving exactly the candidates in A among all distinguished candidates. Let n(A) = |V (A)|. We calculate the AV scores of all
non-distinguished candidates and rank them according to their AV scores, from those with the highest score to those with the lowest
score, with ties being broken arbitrarily. Let s denote the AV score of the k-th candidate in this rank. For each A ⊆ J and each B ⊆ A
such that |B| ≤ r, we create a non-negative integer variable xA,B which indicates that in a solution we change xA,B votes in V (A) so
that all candidates in B (and exactly these candidates) are removed from these votes. Clearly, we have in total at most 4|J| variables.
The constraints are as follows.
As we change at most ` votes, it holds that ∑
B⊆A⊆J,|B|≤r
xA,B ≤ `.
For each A ⊆ J , it holds that ∑
B⊆A,|B|≤r
xA,B ≤ n(A).
Finally, to ensure that the final score of every distinguished candidate is at most s− 1, for every c ∈ J , it holds that
AV(C,V )(c)−
∑
c∈B,B⊆A⊆J,|B|≤r
xA,B ≤ s− 1.
The above ILP can be solved in FPT time with respect to |J | due to the Lenstra’s theorem [Lenstra 1983].
Note that the fixed-parameter tractability with respect to |J | does not hold for SAV and NSAV as we have shown in the previous
sections that r-DVDCB-SAV and r-DVDCB-NSAV are W[1]-hard with respect to ` and k even when |J | = 1. This is essentially
because that in AV, deleting a candidate from a vote does not affect the AV scores of other candidates in the vote, but in SAV and NSAV,
deleting a candidate from a vote increases the SAV scores of other candidates in the vote. The behavior of AV allows us to only focus
on removing distinguished candidates but the behavior of SAV and NSAV asks us to pay attention to all candidates.
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Based on ILP formulations again, we can show that all problems studied in this paper are FPT with respect to a larger parameter,
namely, the number of candidates m. This holds for all five rules studied in the paper. At a high level, the algorithm first guesses the
exact winning k-committees, each of which does not include any distinguished candidates. There are at most 2(
m
k ) ≤ 22m guesses
and each guess involves at most 2m committees. For each guessed class of winning k-committees, we provide an ILP formulation.
Particularly, we partition the votes into at most 2m groups, each group consists of all votes approving the same set of candidates. Then,
for each group, we introduce 2m non-negative integer variables, each of which corresponds to a subset C ′ of candidates and indicates
how many votes from the group are changed into votes approving exactly the candidates in C ′. The constraints are derived to ensure
that all k-committees in the guessed class have the same score which is strictly higher than that of any k-committees not in the class.
For vote-level operations with distance bound r, we should also constraint that the variables corresponding to a group of votes and a
subset C ′ to be 0 if the distance between each vote in the group and C ′ is larger than r. The FPT-running time follows from that we
need to solve at most 22
m
ILPs each of which has at most 2m · 2m = 4m variables, and ILP is FPT with respect to the number of
variables [Lenstra 1983].
THEOREM 5.2 (?). For X ∈ {AV, SAV,NSAV,CCAV,PAV}, the problems DAppAddB-X, DAppDelB-X, r-DVCB-X, r-DVACB-X,
and r-DVDCB-X are FPT with respect to the number of candidates. The results for r-DVCB-X, r-DVACB-X, and r-DVDCB-X hold for
all possible values of r.
Finally, we study the parameter n, the number of votes. We first have the following FPT result.
THEOREM 5.3 (?). r-DVDCB-AV for all possible values of r can be solved in O∗(2n) time, where n denotes the number of votes.
PROOF. Let ((C, V ), J ⊆ C, k, `) be an r-DVDCB-AV instance where r is an integer. Our algorithm goes as follows. We order all
non-distinguished candidates according to their AV scores, from the highest to the lowest, with ties being broken arbitrarily. Let s denote
the score of the k-th candidate in the order. Let
J ′ = {c ∈ J : AV(c) ≥ s}
be the set of distinguished candidates whose AV scores are at least s. We guess the ` votes which need to be modified to make all
distinguished candidates be excluded from all winning k-committees. Precisely, we split the instance into at most 2n subinstances each
of which takes as input the original instance together with a subset V ′ ⊆ V of ` votes, and the question is whether we can modify exactly
the votes in V ′ to exclude all distinguished candidates from any winning k-committee. Clearly, the original instance is a Yes-instance if
and only if at least one of the subinstances is a Yes-instance. To solve a subinstance corresponding to a subset V ′ ⊆ V , we reduce it to
a maximum network flow instance. Particularly, in the maximum network flow instance, we have a source node v+ and a sink node v−.
Moreover, for each vote v ∈ V ′, we create a node denoted still by v for simplicity. For each distinguished candidate c ∈ J ′ we create
a node denoted still by c for simplicity. The arcs are as follows. There is an arc from the source node v+ to every vote-vertex v with
capacity min{r, |v∩J ′|}. For a vote-node v and a candidate-node c, there is an arc from v to cwith capacity 1 if and only if v approves c,
i.e., c ∈ v. Finally, for each candidate-node c ∈ J ′ there is an arc from c to the sink node v− with capacity AV(c)− s+ 1. It is easy to
see that the subinstance is a Yes-instance if and only if the above constructed network has a flow of size
∑
c∈J′(AV(c) − s + 1). The
theorem follows from that the maximum network flow problem can be solved in polynomial-time (see, e.g., [Orlin 2013]).
We can show that for the other two vote-level operations, the corresponding problems are also FPT with respect to n when r = 2m.
To solve the problems, we enumerate all subsets of at most ` votes which are considered to be modified. Once the modified votes
are determined, we can solve the instance greedily when the distance restriction is dropped: for the VAC operation, we add all non-
distinguished candidates in these vote, and for the VC operation, we let each of these votes approve exactly all non-distinguished
candidates. Note that in the worst case, the Hamming distance between the original and the new votes can be 2m.
THEOREM 5.4 (?). r-DVCB-AV and r-DVACB-AV for r = 2m can be solved in O∗(2n) time where n is the number of votes.
PROOF. We enumerate all FPT many modifications of at most ` votes. Once a vote is determined to be modified, it is always optimal
to change it so that none of the distinguished candidates is approved and all the non-distinguished candidates are approved. So, for each
enumeration, we determine if there are at least k candidates whose AV scores are strictly larger than that of any distinguished candidates
after changing the corresponding votes as discussed above. If this is the case, the given instance is a Yes-instance; otherwise we proceed
to the next enumeration. If none of the enumeration leads to a Yes-answer, we conclude that the given instance is a No-instance.
6. CONCLUSION
We have studied the (parameterized) complexity of five destructive bribery problems in the setting of approval-based multi-winner
voting. These problems model the scenario where a briber aims to exclude all of a given set of candidates from having any chance to win
by bribing some voters yet not exceeding her/his budget. Our study significantly complements previous study because bribery problems
for ABM rules in the destructive model have not been widely studied prior to our work. For the five well-studied ABM rules AV, SAV,
NSAV, CCAV, and PAV, we provided a comprehensive landscape of the (parameterized) complexity of these problems. Our results are
summarized in Table 2.
There are many possibilities for future work. First, one can always start by resolving open problems left. For instance, all problems
considered in this paper are FPT with respect to the number of candidates. However, we have only a few FPT-algorithms with respect
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to the number of votes, leaving many cases remained open. It should be noted that many control and manipulation problems are already
NP-hard even when the number of voters is a constant [Chen et al. 2017; Bachmeier et al. 2019; Betzler et al. 2011]. Second, our study is
purely theoretical analysis. One can conduct experimental work to investigate whether these problems are really hard to solve in practice.
Third, the complexity of these problems in special dichotomous domains is widely open. For concepts of dichotomous domains we refer
to [Elkind et al. 2017; Elkind and Lackner 2015; Yang 2019b].
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